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JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MUST SAFEGUARD, NOT
THREATEN, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION
SANDRA DAY O'CONNORt
This issue of the Denver University Law Review is devoted to an
important subject: judicial accountability. Properly understood, judicial
accountability is a fundamental democratic requirement of our federal
and State governments. Put simply, judges must be accountable to the
public for their constitutional role of applying the law fairly and impar-
tially. Judicial accountability, however, is a concept that is frequently
misunderstood at best and abused at worst. It has become a rallying cry
for those who want in reality to dictate substantive judicial outcomes.
The notion of accountability is superficially attractive: judges who reach
outcomes that part ways with the will of the majority--often mislabeled
"activist" judges-should be held "accountable."
This simplistic understanding of accountability-judicial account-
ability for the majority's desired substantive outcomes-ignores the role
of the judiciary and indeed the very structure of our democratic govern-
ments, State and federal. Worse, this perversion of the concept of judi-
cial accountability threatens to undermine the safeguards of democracy
and liberty that were so brilliantly conceived by those who first designed
our governmental institutions and drafted our Constitution. In short,
"[p]opulist, substance-based accountability for judges is precisely what
the Founders feared[.]" ' The Framers placed at the core of the judici-
ary's design the concept of judicial independence as a means to guaran-
tee the Rule of Law. Judicial independence is the vital mechanism that
empowers judges to make decisions that may be unpopular but nonethe-
less correct. In so doing, the judiciary vindicates the principle that no
person or group, however powerful, is above the law. And it gives life to
the promise that the Rule of Law safeguards the minority from the tyr-
anny of the majority.2
Alexander Hamilton, one of the Framers of the United States Con-
stitution, wrote in The Federalist No. 78 to defend the role of the judici-
ary in the constitutional structure. He emphasized that "'there is no lib-
erty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
t United States Supreme Court Justice, Retired.
1. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for the
Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 7,8 (2008).
2. 1 ALEXIS DE TocQuEvLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Ch. VI (Henry Reeve trans.,
1835).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
executive powers.' . . . [L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judi-
ciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either
of the other departments. 3  Only with judicial independence can the
reality and the appearance of zealous adherence to the Rule of Law be
guaranteed to the people. As former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
wrote, government "keeps its promises, or does not keep them, in its
courts. For the individual, therefore, . . . the struggle for constitutional
government is a struggle for good laws, indeed, but also for intelligent,
independent, and impartial courts."4
This principle undergirds the place of the judiciary in the United
States. The Founders of the United States recognized that it is essential
to the effective functioning of the judiciary that it not be subject to domi-
nation by other parts of the government. To accomplish this goal, the
United States Constitution established an independent federal judiciary
by separating the law-making function of the legislative branch from the
law-applying role of the judicial branch. This separation of the legisla-
tive and judicial powers has proven essential in maintaining the Rule of
Law. When the roles of lawmaker and judge are played by different state
actors, the danger of government arbitrariness is greatly diminished.
When the power to make laws is separated from the power to interpret
and apply them, the very foundation of the Rule of Law-that controver-
sies are adjudicated on the basis of previously established rules-is
strengthened.
An independent judiciary requires both that individual judges are
independent in the exercise of their powers, and that the judiciary as a
whole is independent, its sphere of authority protected from wrongful
interference by the other two branches of government. Judicial inde-
pendence has both individual and institutional aspects. As for the inde-
pendence of individual judges, there are at least two avenues for securing
that independence: First, judges must be protected from the threat of
reprisals, so that fear does not direct their decision-making. Second, the
method by which judges are selected, and the ethical principles imposed
upon them, must be constructed so as to minimize the risk of corruption
and outside influence. The first endeavor is to protect judicial independ-
ence from outside threats. The second is to ensure that judicial authority
is not abused, and it is the core concern of the enterprise of judicial ac-
countability.
I regret that threats to judicial independence seem to be occurring
with record frequency. Members of Congress have faulted the courts for
their decisions on various issues. There have been demands for "mass
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., William S. Hein &
Co. 2002).
4. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (Co-
lumbia Univ. Press 1911).
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impeachment," stripping the courts of jurisdiction to hear certain types of
cases, and using Congress's budget authority to punish offending judges.
The pages that follow contain some of the most egregious examples.
Judge Edwin Felter discusses South Dakota's 2006 "Jail for Judges" Ini-
tiative, which would have made the State's judges liable in criminal and
civil actions for judicial acts deemed improper by dissatisfied litigants.5
Former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis and Jor-
dan Singer cite House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's remarks that "the
time will come" for federal judges who refused to restore Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube "to answer for their behavior" and that the federal judiciary
was "arrogant, out-of-control, [and] unaccountable. 6 This was after the
federal courts affirmed the state courts in the Terri Schiavo case,7 under
the review required by Congress's one-time only statute.8 Unfortunately
there are many more examples.
In all the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, death threats
have become increasingly common. Judge Greer, who handled the
Schiavo case for over a decade, received many menacing e-mails and
death threats. We've seen this before-Justice Hugo Black often wore a
chest protector provided by the Secret Service when he visited Birming-
ham; my former colleague Harry Blackmun got death threats because of
Roe v. Wade, and his living room window was once shattered by a gun
shot. Recently, we saw a U.S. lawmaker go as far as to suggest that
completed acts of violence against judges and their families were moti-
vated by ideological disagreement with their judicial decisions.9
The exercise of independent judging in the face of such pressure re-
quires great courage. Judges are called upon to stand firm against both
the tide of public opinion and the power of the legislative and executive
branches. A compelling example can be found in the 1954 decision of
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education,'0 which declared
that separate educational facilities for children of different races are in-
herently unequal. The case provoked a firestorm of criticism in much of
the country. The unpopular decision was, however, the necessary first
step in desegregating public institutions in the United States. It was an
exercise of accountability to the Rule of Law over the popular will.
As you review the articles that follow, it is important to locate the
notion of judicial accountability in this larger context. Keep in mind the
5. Edwin L. Felter, Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right and the
Wrong Kind, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. 157, 159 (2008).
6. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1, at 8 n.s.
7. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), affd, 403
F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
8. Act of Mar. 21,2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) ("An Act For the relief of
the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.").
9. Editorial, The Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/06/opinion/06wed I .html.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cornerstone of judicial independence in our democratic governments,
state and federal, and recognize that there are real, mounting threats to
that independence. There are sound ways to achieve judicial account-
ability while safeguarding the role of our courts, accountability consis-
tent with the larger role of the judiciary in our democratic society. True
judicial accountability advances judicial independence and the para-
mount Rule of Law. "Accountability and independence are two sides of
the same coin: accountability ensures that judges perform their constitu-
tional role, and judicial independence protects judges from pressures that
would pull them out of that role."' 1 Indeed, as Kourlis and Singer sug-
gest, the enterprise of accountability may greatly safeguard judicial inde-
pendence; "[e]mbracing accountability for fair and efficient processes
may help stave off irresponsible demands for accountability for deci-
sional outcomes."' 2
True judicial accountability furthers another necessary characteristic
of a functioning judiciary: judicial integrity. An independent and hon-
orable judiciary is indispensable to the Rule of Law. Alexander Hamil-
ton captured this necessity well when he wrote that a "steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws" is essential because "no man
can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injus-
tice, by which he may be the gainer today."'13 If judges are to be the in-
dependent guardians of Rule of Law values, they must be incorruptible.
Judges are entrusted with ultimate decisions over the life, freedoms, du-
ties, rights, and property of citizens. But judges will never win the re-
spect and trust of the citizens if they are subject to corrupt influences.
Whenever a judge makes a decision for personal gain, or to curry favor,
or to avoid censure, that act denigrates the Rule of Law. A third value
may be advanced through judicial accountability properly construed:
judicial competence. A fundamental value of the Rule of Law is that
judicial decisions are not made arbitrarily, but through a process of rea-
soned decision making. The Rule of Law therefore requires that "official
decisions be justified in law, and therefore be reasoned and nonarbitrary
with respect to general legal standards."
1 4
Independence, integrity, and competence, then, are the hallmarks of
a judiciary committed to upholding the Rule of Law and they are the
principles for which a judiciary should be held accountable. In the pages
that follow, the contributors to this issue present and debate proposals to
advance judicial accountability as experienced in our federal, State, and
administrative courts.
11. Sandra Day O'Connor & RonNell Anderson Jones, Reflections on Arizona's Judicial
Selection Process, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23 (2008).
12. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1, at 9.
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 430.
14. Steven J. Burton, Particularism, Discretion, and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 178, 187 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
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Leading off, Kourlis and Singer propose a framework for a federal
judicial performance evaluation program.' 5 Because state judicial per-
formance evaluation programs have been so successful, they argue, fed-
eral judges could equally benefit from them. Implementing a federal
judicial performance evaluation program, they conclude, could preserve
judicial independence, provide information for judges to improve their
performance, and increase the public's confidence in the courts.
Next, using principles derived from international Rule of Law ini-
tiatives and international economic development, Norman L. Greene
considers the relationship between fair and impartial courts and eco-
nomic development in the United States.' 6 Greene argues that state court
judicial elections in the United States violate the Rule of Law and lead to
adverse economic effects at home in much the same way they lead to
adverse economic effects abroad. For the welfare of the economy,
Greene concludes, Americans should eliminate judicial elections.
Washington State University Professor David C. Brody then ana-
lyzes the methods by which states assess the effectiveness of their judi-
cial performance evaluation programs.17 Brody surveys the conventions
of judicial performance evaluations, and examines the impact that
evaluations have on judicial accountability. He presents the results of a
case study on the importance of methodology in judicial performance
evaluations, and concludes that maintaining effective and trustworthy
judicial performance evaluation programs will result in a desirable bal-
ance of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Colorado administrative law judge Edwin L. Felter, Jr., then dis-
cusses and evaluates several forms of accountability in the administrative
law judiciary, and compares them with prevalent forms of accountability
in the judicial branch.' 8 Felter argues that codes of judicial conduct, as
well as formal enforcement mechanisms, work together to maintain a
balance of independence and accountability in the administrative law
judiciary.
Next up is James Bopp, Jr., who argued Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White,' 9 and Josiah Neeley. They probe commonly-cited criti-
cisms of privately funded judicial election systems, and identify potential
weaknesses of publicly funded judicial election systems. 20  Bopp and
15. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1.
16. Norman L. Greene, Perspectives from the Rule of Law and International Economic De-
velopment: Are there Lessons for the Reform of Judicial Selection in the United States?, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 53 (2008).
17. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Ac-
countability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115 (2008).
18. Felter, supra note 5.
19. 536 U.S. 735 (2002).
20. James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis, White,
and the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 175 (2008).
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Neeley argue that common criticisms of private funding are hyperbolic,
and question the constitutionality of bans on personal solicitation of
funds by judicial candidates, as well as the constitutionality of certain
provisions of publicly-funded judicial elections. They conclude that re-
strictions on judicial candidates' speech will not effectively reform judi-
cial elections.
Taking on Bopp and Neeley, Georgetown University Professor Roy
A. Schotland argues that the personal solicitation of campaign funding
by judges is problematic.2' Schotland identifies "six fatal flaws" with
Bopp and Neeley's argument, examining judges' personal solicitation of
campaign funds in historical, constitutional, and pragmatic contexts.
Finally, former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice and current Uni-
versity of Tennessee Professor Penny J. White examines John Grisham's
fictionalized account of a corporate defendant's scheme to oust a state
supreme court justice and replace her with an appointee more friendly to
the defendant's case.22 White argues that situations similar to Grisham's
fiction are not only plausible, but have repeatedly occurred. An "appeal
to the masses" through the medium of fiction, she concludes, could spark
greater public concern with the current state of the courts.
I am hopeful that some of these interesting proposals and ideas
will help us stem the tide of threats to the independence of our judiciar-
ies. The fair and effective functioning of our democracy demands as
much.
21. Roy A. Schotland, Six Fatal Flaws: A Comment on Bopp and Neeley, 86 DENY. U. L.
REV. 233 (2008).
22. Penny J. White, "The Appeal" to the Masses, 86 DENY. L. REV. 251 (2008).
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